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On 4 November 2018, eligible New Caledonian voters will 
participate in a referendum on whether the territory will become 
independent from France. President Emmanuel Macron made 
his first visit to the territory on 3–5 May and committed to 
respect the outcome of the vote, as did his predecessor 
François Hollande. Macron added that ‘France would not be 
the same without New Caledonia’. His visit coincided with the 
marking of 30 years since the deaths of 21 people during a 
French military operation to rescue gendarmes taken hostage 
by pro-independence partisans on the island of Ouvéa in 
1988 (Fisher 4/5/2018). A year later, widely respected pro-
independence leader Jean-Marie Tjibaou was gunned down 
while observing a commemoration for the 19 Kanak victims. 
Some local groups opposed President Macron’s attendance 
at the commemoration, reinforcing the sense that, although 
New Caledonia has come a long way since the violence of the 
1980s, the past remains present and painful in local memory. 
Macron’s visit also coincided with the 20-year anniversary of 
the Noumea Accord, which consolidated peace and created 
New Caledonia’s present political institutions.
Local political parties have long been focused on the 
upcoming vote. With less than six months until the referendum, 
this In Brief, building on Parts 1 and 2 (Robertson 2017, 2018), 
focuses on three major issues likely to feature in the vote: the 
economy, security, and citizenship and identity. 
The economy
New Caledonia and the other Pacific French territories — 
French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna — enjoy substantially 
higher standards of living, access to infrastructure, health 
and education services than other Pacific island states and 
territories, largely due to the budgetary assistance of France. 
New Caledonia also generates significant wealth from its 
nickel sector, accounting for roughly one quarter of global 
deposits and being the world’s second largest exporter.
France spends approximately AU$1.5 billion annually in 
New Caledonia, which includes the salaries and pensions 
of public servants such as the police, military and prison 
officers. The French also fund development contracts with 
the three provincial governments for various infrastructure and 
development programs. 
The New Caledonian economy remains dependent on 
French state support, which contributes to the high cost of 
living. For 30 years the Kanak independence movement has 
emphasised the need for greater control over the nickel sector 
in order to build the territory’s economic autonomy, especially 
through the Koniambo nickel mine in North Province. However, 
recent low nickel prices have necessitated French government 
intervention in order to prevent job losses in the nickel sector. 
Attempts to diversify the local economy towards tourism, 
aquaculture and other sectors have struggled. 
It is widely acknowledged that New Caledonia’s standard 
of living will fall if independence is achieved, although current 
prosperity remains heavily concentrated in the hands of a 
mostly European minority, even if conditions have improved for 
many as a result of certain ‘rebalancing’ policy measures since 
the 1990s (Ris 28/9/2016). Though Kanak have enjoyed equal 
legal citizenship since 1946, this has not translated to equal 
social and economic outcomes. Pro-independence advocates 
argue that much of France’s expenditure returns to France in 
different forms.  
Security
Political discourse has long been dominated by concerns over 
allegedly rising levels of crime, youth delinquency, and drug 
and alcohol abuse, primarily among Kanak youth. Conservative 
loyalist figures have demanded increased measures to combat 
crime, including more police and programs for recidivist youth. 
Since law enforcement, including local municipal police and 
the gendarmerie, remain under metropolitan control, loyalist 
parties continue to see current security problems as a portent 
of what independence might entail. 
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In response, the French government has announced 
increased resources to meet the perceived security challenge, 
with President Macron stating he considered ‘France necessary 
to maintain the peace’ among New Caledonia’s population. 
Visiting Pierre-Lenquette, one of Noumea’s most disadvantaged 
communities, he announced that his government would fund a 
special security force to combat petty crime and delinquency 
(Ponchelet 4/5/2018). The French government also committed 
to expanding the ‘Adapted Military Service’ program designed 
to provide skills and grounding to youth who have failed to 
complete their schooling.
The Customary Senate, a consultative institution created 
under the Noumea Accord to represent Kanak custom, has 
been working with delinquent youth who are often framed 
as having lost their cultural and social bearings. However, 
their calls for increased resources have been either ignored 
or rebuffed by the loyalist legislators. The pro-independence 
parties have spoken of the structural inequalities that persist 
between the Kanak and non-Kanak populations, where a 
lack of jobs and educational success prevent Kanak youth 
from integrating into mainstream society. Kanak individuals 
dominate the incarcerated population in ‘Camp-Est’, the 
infamous Nouville prison ranked as having among the worst 
conditions in the French Republic.
Citizenship and identity
These issues of economic prosperity, standard of living and 
security form part of broader questions about citizenship and 
belonging. New Caledonians are French citizens and possess 
the same rights as their metropolitan counterparts. The same 
is not true for all French citizens who come to New Caledonia. 
As a result of the 1998 Noumea Accord, French citizens must 
have arrived prior to 5 May 1998 to have New Caledonian 
citizenship, which determines who can vote in local provincial 
elections and serves as a basis for preference in certain job 
sectors. French and European courts justified this distinction 
between French and New Caledonian people because of the 
decolonisation process in place and the impact of French 
migration on Kanak self-determination, but noted that this 
would be temporary until the referendum process had been 
completed. One of the critical questions is therefore what 
New Caledonian citizenship would entail if there is a ‘no’ vote 
to independence.  
Both the French government and the Kanak independence 
movement have stated that dual nationality would be 
possible in the event of independence, though some anti-
independence parties have argued New Caledonians should 
lose their French nationality. 
While the days of Jacobin French republican ideology, 
which sought to efface the very essence of New Caledonian 
autonomy, have receded, there remains a strong identification 
with France that goes beyond a simple economic question. 
Students still overwhelmingly study in French universities, and 
many New Caledonians have family members who live there. 
However, this must be balanced with an increased recognition 
of New Caledonia’s place in the Pacific region, including 
personal, economic and cultural ties with Australia and New 
Zealand and how New Caledonia is impacted by the growing 
power of China in the South Pacific. 
This shared citizenship exists between New Caledonia and 
other French territories of the Pacific, French Polynesia and 
Wallis and Futuna. For example, the French government pays 
the New Caledonian hospital system to treat and host patients 
from Wallis and Futuna, which does not have access to the 
same health facilities. Independence, therefore, would result at 
least in a renegotiation of relations between these territories. 
It is not possible to discuss the many other aspects to the 
question of independence in this short paper. Just as intriguing 
is what will happen in the event of a ‘no’ vote — still the most 
likely outcome, but far from guaranteed. Will pro-independence 
political leaders decide to pursue a second and even a third 
referendum? Will anti-independence leaders make further 
concessions, such as even greater local autonomy, to remove 
independence from the table? What is essential is that the long 
anticipated referendum takes place and that it is legitimate and 
its outcome reflects the will of those who call the territory home.
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